Here is an article that I wrote for the South Carolina Bar Labor & Employment Law Section Newsletter on changes to what constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the ADAAA.
SC Bar Employment & Labor Law Article on Changes to the ADAAA
Since the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), the U.S. Courts of Appeals have been tasked with interpreting the Act without much guidance from its predecessor, the ADA. The Fourth Circuit recently made one such decision in Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., No. 13-1645, (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2014). The case provides substantial guidance as to the application of the ADAAA to temporary disabilities in holding that
an employee’s temporary impairment—in this instance, “broken legs and injured tendons” that rendered the employee “completely immobile for more than seven months”—can constitute a disability under the ADAAA.
Summers, the plaintiff in the case, began working as a senior analyst for Altarum, a government contractor in Alexandria, VA, in July 2011. In his position, Summers was assigned to work for Altarum’s client, the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE). Accordingly, Summers’ job duties required him to travel to the DCoE’s offices in Maryland to conduct statistical research, draft reports and make presentations. Altarum allowed its employees to work remotely, so long as the client for which the employee was working approved the remote work. In Summers’ situation, the DCoE did allow contractors to work remotely from home when they were “putting in extra time” on a given project.
On October 17, 2011, Summers fell and injured himself while exiting a commuter train, resulting in a fracture and meniscus tendon tear in his left leg, a ruptured patellar tendon in his right leg, and a broken right ankle. After undergoing multiple operations, his physicians advised that he could not put any weight on his left leg for six weeks and estimated that he would not be able to walk normally again for at least seven months.
While in the hospital, Summers contacted Altarum and inquired about short-term disability, as well as the prospect of potentially working remotely from home during his recovery. A human resources representative from Altarum agreed to discuss “accommodations that would allow Summers to return to work” and suggested that Summers take short-term disability and focus on his recovery. Thereafter, Summers sent e-mails to his supervisors at both Alatrum and DCoE seeking advice about how he should plan on returning to work. In his e-mails, Summers proposed a plan allowing him to take a few weeks of short-term disability, followed by a period of part-time remote work, with his full return to work following thereafter. Despite the company’s prior agreement to open discussions about a reasonable accommodation, it nevertheless refused to follow through in participating in any form of discussions or negotiations as to Summers’ proposed gradual return plan. To the contrary, Altarum terminated Summers on December 1, 2011 “in order to place another analyst in his role at DCoE.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, litigation followed.
Summers filed suit in federal court alleging failure to accommodate and disability discrimination. In response, Altarum filed a motion to dismiss wherein it argued that, while Summers was physically impaired, he was not a “qualified person with a disability” under the Act. Therefore, Altarum argued, he was not entitled to any of the protections afforded to disabled individuals under the Act. The district court agreed with Altarum and held that a “temporary condition, even up to a year, does not fall within the purview of the Act” and, accordingly, that Summers was not a disabled individual under the Act.
This appeal followed and the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a temporary impairment could in fact qualify as a disability under the ADAAA if it was “sufficiently severe.” The Fourth Circuit held that Summers’ temporary impairment met this standard. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the ADAAA was enacted for the purpose of broadening the definition of disability “[i]n response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that Congress believed improperly restricted the scope of the ADA.” The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)—wherein the Supreme Court suggested that a temporary impairment could not qualify as a disability under the ADA—was one such case that “Congress sought to override” with the ADAAA. The court further noted that the EEOC’s regulations on the ADAAA “expressly provide that effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting for purposes of proving an actual disability.” Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, while the district court’s analysis was “an entirely reasonable interpretation of Toyota and its progeny,” the district court was nevertheless relying on bad law under the ADAAA. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that it was entering unchartered territory as it was “the first appellate court to apply the amendment’s expanded definition of ‘disability.’” Not to fret, the court noted that the “absence of appellate precedent presents no difficulty in this case: Summers has unquestionably alleged a ‘disability’ under the ADAAA sufficiently plausible to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
The court further critiqued the district court’s ruling by stating that the lower court not only erred in relying upon pre-ADAAA cases, “but also in misapplying the ADA disability analysis” used under both the ADAAA and the ADA. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court incorrectly “reasoned that, because Summers could have worked with a wheelchair, he must not have been disabled.” The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion on this point by stating that “[t]his inverts the appropriate inquiry” as a court must first establish whether an employee is disabled before determining whether the employee is capable of working with or without a reasonable accommodation. In essence, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court put the cart before the horse. The court concluded that the district court’s entire analysis was erroneous, pointing out that “[i]f the fact that a person could work with the help of a wheelchair meant that he was not disabled under the Act, the ADA would be eviscerated.”
The Summers decision marks the first instance in which a federal appellate court has applied the ADAAA’s expanded definition of disability in terms of duration. The case also marks the first time that a circuit court has conducted an in-depth analysis of Congress’ intent behind enacting the ADAAA. The court’s decision provides a detailed examination of the broadened meaning of disability under the ADAAA in contrast with the previous more limited definition under the ADA. Further, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis declares in no uncertain terms that an employee suffering from a temporary impairment that is “sufficiently severe” can be covered by the expanded definition of disability under the ADAAA and, accordingly, fall under the protections afforded to such individuals under the Act. This case may also have significant impacts on temporary, but sufficiently severe, pregnancy-related complications, triggering a duty to accommodate pregnant employees under the ADAAA.
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